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THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL FALLACY AND SARTRE’S 
ILLUSION OF IMMANENCE: 
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND 
PHENOMENOLOGY AGAINST MENTAL REIFICATION 
– Simon Gusman –
Abstract. Throughout the history of analytic philosophy the notion of the ‘phenomenological falla-
cy’ originally formulated by Place, has been used to criticize reification of the mental. Although 
this fallacy was originally not used to criticize the phenomenological tradition, it has popped up 
recently in debates between analytic philosophers and phenomenologists. However, a study of the 
history of both traditions reveals that a polemical notion similar, if not identical, to the phenome-
nological fallacy can be found within the phenomenological tradition, namely Sartre’s ‘illusion of 
immanence’. In this article, I will explicate these two polemical notions and place them in the con-
text of their respective traditions. This will reveal that both notions must be understood as criticism 
of a certain form of representationalism I will call ‘dual-world representationalism’. This deep-
rooted similarity between analytic philosophy of mind and phenomenology, in turn, sheds a new 
light on current discussions between the two traditions. On a final note, I compare the criticism to 
the views of Metzinger, a contemporary analytic philosopher who uses the phenomenological fal-
lacy to accuse his adversaries. 
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy, illusion of immanence, mental reification, phenomenology, 
representationalism, analytic-continental divide, Jean-Paul Sartre. 
1. Introduction
Although there have been many intersections in the last years, there is still 
much bad blood between phenomenology and analytic philosophy of mind. An 
example of this is the notion of the ‘phenomenological fallacy’, originally formu-
lated by U.T. Place.1 This is a polemical term used in analytic philosophy of mind 
to accuse someone of mistaking their own experience of the world for how things 
are when we abstract from their experience. It is ambiguous whether the fallacy is 
meant to accuse phenomenologists, as the term ‘phenomenological’ is used to refer 
1 Place [1956]. 
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to both the phenomenological method and movement on the one hand, and to 
phenomenal experience on the other.2 However, this choice of words becomes 
precarious and can be misinterpreted easily when the two traditions meet, as they 
often have in recent years. 
However, in recent debates between the two traditions, the analytic philos-
opher Thomas Metzinger uses the fallacy to accuse those who think that the ob-
jects of our phenomenal experience genuinely exist, of committing what he calls 
the error of phenomenological reification: they treat the contents of experience as 
though they were internal and nonphysical things, rather than a temporal pro-
cess.3 He does not accuse a specific philosopher, but thinks it is the view of com-
mon sense or ‘folk-psychology’.4 However, in his discussion with phenomenolo-
gist Dan Zahavi, he also regards the phenomenological tradition as a ‘dressed-up 
form of folk psychology’.5 Thereby, he implicitly does accuse phenomenology of 
committing the phenomenological fallacy. Furthermore, he regards Zahavi’s at-
tempts at introducing notions of the phenomenological tradition in contemporary 
debates to be solely of historical value.6 He goes on to ask: ‘Where is the phenom-
enological contribution that lives up to the standards of conceptual precision of 
today’s best current philosophy of mind?’7 
Many theoretical reasons can be given as to why an accusation of commit-
ting the phenomenological fallacy addressed at phenomenology is unfounded. In 
this article, however, I will show that the accusation is questionable from a histori-
cal perspective. A very similar polemical notion can namely be found within the 
phenomenological tradition. This is the ‘illusion of immanence’ coined by Sartre, 
little more than a decade before Place.8 A closer study of the phenomenological 
fallacy on the one hand and the illusion of immanence on the other will show that, 
historically, analytic philosophy of mind and phenomenology are actually very 
similar in their criticism of the reification of the mental. 
                                                 
2 Zahavi [2005] p. 11–12. 
3 Metzinger [2003] p. 22, 271. 
4 Ibidem, p. 22. 
5 Metzinger [2006] p. 3. 
6 Ibidem. Zahavi has done a great deal of introducing notions from the phenomenological tradi-
tion, primarily of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, in analytic debates. The most 
prominent publications are: Gallagher, Zahavi [2008]; Zahavi [2014]. 
7 Ibidem. 
8 Sartre [1940, 2004a]. 
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The first part of this article will be an examination of the phenomenological 
fallacy as it was introduced by Place in his article Is consciousness a brain process?9 
Place’s position will be elucidated by comparing it to a similar view found in the 
works of one of his main inspirations, Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind.10 Ryle 
offers similar criticism, albeit in the debate concerning imagination rather than 
perception, as Place does. It will be shown that the criticism of reification is rooted 
in the criticism of a broader view, namely a form of representationalism that enta-
ils a dualism of an inner and outer world. In the second part, I will focus on the 
similar criticism of mental reification and representationalism found in the phe-
nomenological tradition, focusing on Sartre’s illusion of immanence as presented 
in The Imaginary.11 The notion will be traced back through the inspiration he took 
from Husserl, in order to clarify the notion and show that the criticism is more 
broadly represented within the phenomenological tradition. Sartre and Husserl 
also offer their criticism of reification in different debates. Sartre, like Ryle, discus-
ses imagination, while Husserl discusses both perception and mental life in gene-
ral. On a final note, I will briefly compare Metzinger’s own views on experience to 
the criticism offered in both traditions, in order to show that he himself commits 
the phenomenological fallacy he uses to accuse phenomenology. 
2. The Phenomenological Fallacy: Place and Ryle 
As said, the term ‘phenomenological fallacy’ has been coined by Place. In 
his article, it is Place’s goal to debunk certain presuppositions about consciousness 
which stand in the way of a scientific explanation of consciousness. One of these 
presuppositions is the idea that there are two sets of events in reality, one physico-
chemical, and another psychical.12 This idea is caused by a certain mistake. The 
definition, which is also quoted by Metzinger,13 is as follows: 
This logical mistake, which I shall refer to as the ‘phenomenological fallacy,’ is the 
mistake of supposing that when the subject describes his experience, when he de-
scribes how things look, sound, smell, taste, or feel to him, he is describing the lite-
ral properties of objects and events on a peculiar sort of internal cinema or televi-
                                                 
9 Place [1956]. 
10 Ryle [1949]. 
11 Sartre [2004a]. 
12 Place [1956] p. 49. 
13 Metzinger [2003] p. 22. 
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sion screen, usually referred to in the modern psychological literature as the ‘phe-
nomenal field.’14 
The phenomenological fallacy, as described here by Place, is a certain form 
of representationalism.15 This is a view of perception which states that our percep-
tual experience does not grant us direct access to the world around us, but only 
via representations or duplications of the objects in the world, projected inside of 
us. 
In contrast with Metzinger, Place does not associate the fallacy with the 
view of common sense, but rather with the bunk of psychologists, physiologists 
and past philosophers, none of which he refers to by name.16 However, like 
Metzinger, Place thinks the fallacy has experiential origins. What gives rise to the 
fallacy are experiences in which there seems to be an object present to us, but there 
is actually none. He gives the example of the afterimage: If you look at a red light, 
and move away your gaze, you experience a green blob. There is nothing green in 
your surroundings, so you infer that there must be something green somewhere 
else. Because it is not outside, it must be somehow inside of you. This type of rea-
soning causes people to assume the existence of some kind of mental realm. Once 
the existence of this realm is posited, this reasoning concerning absent objects is 
then applied to all experience. This causes the mental realm to be conceived of as 
some kind of a copy of the outside world. So, when we describe our experience, 
we describe the features of these copied images. According to Place, this is a mis-
taken assumption: 
The phenomenological fallacy […] depends on the mistaken assumption that be-
cause our ability to describe things in our environment depends on our conscio-
usness of them, our descriptions of things are primarily descriptions of our con-
scious experience and only secondarily, indirectly and inferentially descriptions of 
the objects and events in our environments.17 
                                                 
14 Place [1956] p. 49. 
15 Representationalism as understood here is the idea that we do not directly perceive the world 
outside of us but only perceive internal objects that act as pictures or signs of the objects in the 
external world. This view should not be confused with the more recent form of representationalism 
present in philosophy of mind in which the conscious experiences themselves are regarded as rep-
resentational, not their objects. These two forms of representationalism are often contrasted by the 
first classic representationalism as opposed to modern representationalism. Cf. Seager, Bourget 
[2007]. 
16 Place [1956] p. 49. 
17 Ibidem.  
Simon Gusman ◦ The Phenomenological Fallacy and Sartre’s Illusion of Immanence: Analytic... 
 22 
This mistake is the reason why the mental realm is compared to a cinema or 
television screen on which a projected image of the world can be seen. When we 
look at a television program about trains, we only see trains on a screen, which 
depict trains somewhere in the world. In the case of the afterimage, there is some 
kind of disturbance in this process which causes something to appear on the 
screen which does not correspond to something outside of us. This view is the in-
version of how perception works according to Place. When we describe how 
something looks, sounds, smells, tastes or feels, we describe actual properties of 
those things. Only secondarily can we describe our consciousness of them. When 
we describe our experience, we do not describe properties of our experience, or as 
Place calls them, phenomenal properties. Rather we describe ‘the things them-
selves’,18 as Place, perhaps unknowingly, invokes the famous phenomenological 
slogan.19  
Thus, committing the phenomenological fallacy amounts to more than just 
mental reification. It means adhering to a certain representationalist view of per-
ception, of which reification is only one facet. In this view, we do not directly 
perceive the objects in the outside world, but rather objects within ourselves. This 
seems to correspond to the phenomenological reification Metzinger stresses.20 But 
the view is more elaborate than just this. The objects are conceived of as having the 
same kind of sensible properties that things in the outside world have, i.e., colors, 
sounds, smells, shapes, etc. Because of their similarity to things in the outside 
world, they are also conceived of as spatial, which causes the mental realm itself to 
be seen as a literal place, a spatial container of some sort. Place calls this the ‘mys-
terious internal environment’ and the ‘mythological “phenomenal field”’.21 This 
place mirrors the outside world not only in its structure, but also in its content. 
That is to say, the inner environment depicting the outside world, hence the meta-
phor of cinema or television. Thus, if I look at a chair, there is an image of chair 
projected in the inner realm which represents the chair in front of me, but is a dif-
ferent object. This view is a specific subversion of representationalism, as it adds 
the idea that the representations have the same threefold structure as the physical 
                                                 
18 Ibidem. 
19 Husserl stated in the introduction to his Logical Investigations that ‘we must go back to the “things 
themselves”’ (Husserl [2001a] p. 168). He meant by this that in order to fruitfully study our experi-
ence, we must get rid of our theoretical presuppositions and focus solely on experience, and the 
things as they appear in experience, themselves.  This became one of the central ideas of phenome-
nology, and ‘to think things themselves’ became the unofficial slogan. Hickerson [2007] p. 19. 
20 Metzinger [2003] p. 22. 
21 Ibidem, p. 44, 49. 
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world, namely that of objects with properties that reside in a spatial container. 
It is a kind of duality which entails duplication not only of an object, but also of 
worlds: one physical world outside of us, and another psychical world on the in-
side. 
Although Place is the first one to use the term ‘phenomenological fallacy’, 
he mentions Wittgenstein and Ryle as philosophers who already took steps to-
wards his goal to show that consciousness is ultimately a brain process.22 Ryle crit-
icizes a similar view, especially considering the duplication of worlds.23 The pri-
mary focus of his main work, The Concept of Mind, is to get rid of ‘Descartes’ myth’ 
and ‘the dogma of the ghost in the machine’, which entails mind-matter dualism. 
He also emphasizes the spatial nature of this view, calling it the ‘two-worlds 
myth’, ‘two-worlds story’ or ‘two-worlds legend’.24 This myth is, however, a less 
precise position than Place’s dual-world representationalism. It encompasses all 
philosophical positions that make a strict distinction between the physical and the 
mental, and claim that although bodies exist in the physical world, mental events 
exist in another realm. This view is not only prevalent in philosophy of perception, 
but prominent in many philosophical disciplines. It is also considered to be the 
view of common sense, and Ryle ultimately blames the way we ordinarily speak 
about the mental for it.25 Ryle’s aim is to reexamine mental concepts in order to 
show that they do not entail separate mental and physical processes. 
In his discussion of the mental activity of imagination, Ryle criticizes 
a version of the two-world story that corresponds more closely to the 
representationalism of the phenomenological fallacy. We are easily tempted to say 
of imaginations or images that they exist within the mind, but this amounts to 
a mistake similar to the type of reasoning about after-images Place mentions: 
What are spoken of as ‘visual images’, ‘mental pictures’, ‘auditory images’ […] are 
commonly taken to be entities which are genuinely found existing and found exi-
sting elsewhere than in the external world. So minds are nominated for their the-
atres. 
                                                 
22 Ibidem, p. 44. 
23 Although Wittgenstein employs the same kind of reasoning in the Philosophical Investigations 
mentioned by Place, he does not address the problem in terms of two worlds. He does this explicit-
ly, however, in the posthumously published Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology [1990] and 
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology [1998]. Although written before Place’s article, they were not 
published until 1980 and 1982, respectively. Therefore, I will not discuss them here any further. 
24 Ryle [2009] p. 1, 5, 13, 118, 121. 
25 Ibidem, p. 1. 
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Ryle speaks of the mental images involved in imagination in the same way 
as Place talks about perception in general. Because images are not outside of us in 
the same manner as physical objects, they must exist inside of us. The kind of spa-
tial reasoning is similar. People ask the question about the location of the afteri-
mage and conclude that because it is not in the surroundings, it must be in a men-
tal location. In the same way, because we talk about seeing mental images as in 
Ryle’s case, we ask the question where they are, assuming that they have a loca-
tion. This means that the images are taken to be genuinely existing entities in 
a mental world in the same manner as physical entities relate to the outside world. 
Instead of the television screen, Ryle invokes the similar metaphor of the theatre, 
and also calls it ‘a gallery which only he can visit’.26 The story is thus the same as 
the one Place criticizes. This view of imagination invokes two worlds which share 
the same threefold structure of objects, properties and spatiality, and the mental 
world is seen as representing the outside one. Unlike Place but like Metzinger, 
Ryle regards this to be the view of common sense. 
According to Ryle, the idea that causes this conception of the mental is that 
seeing and picturing are the same process. The only difference is that the things 
observed are situated in different worlds. The difference between these worlds is 
that the physical world is accessible to everyone, while the internal world is a pri-
vate affair. This misconception arose because we speak about mental imaginary as 
things seen by the mind’s eye. Furthermore, because seeing and picturing are re-
garded as similar activities, the things pictured are conceived of as accurate por-
traits of things in the outside world. Thus, if someone is picturing a mountain, 
we regard this image of the mountain as having the same relation to the mountain 
as a photograph of the mountain has.27  
This confusion about picturing and seeing brings us to the main difference 
between Place and Ryle. Although the duality of worlds and the representational 
structure is identical, Ryle’s argument is aimed at those who consider imagination 
to be similar to perception, while Place’s argument is aimed at a theory of percep-
tion. The position of the phenomenological fallacy is about our access to the out-
side world, whereas the position Ryle criticized is a wrong conception of mental 
imaginary. The difference is that for Place all perception of the outside world re-
quires representation, while for Ryle only imagination does so. In Ryle’s version, 
sensory perception is seeing an object outside of you, while picturing is seeing 
                                                 
26 Ibidem, p. 224. 
27 Ibidem. 
Simon Gusman ◦ The Phenomenological Fallacy and Sartre’s Illusion of Immanence: Analytic... 
 25 
a representation inside of you. In Place’s view, sensory perception itself evokes the 
uses of the world of images. 
Place does not discuss the difference between sensory perception and imag-
ination. However, if we consider the fact that the afterimage is seen as an anomaly 
on the screen, we can argue that in imagination something similar is the case. 
Something is depicted on the inner screen, which does not immediately corre-
spond to something present outside of us. If we consider this, and the fact that 
Ryle dismisses any kind of ‘two-world story’, we can say that the underlying rep-
resentational model is the same, regardless of where one draws the line between 
when objects appear in the inner world. That is, whether representation is in-
volved only in imagination or in all forms of experience.  
Ryle dismisses the two-world myth by showing that the way we speak 
about mental images as things that can be seen by the mind’s eye is wrong. He 
thinks that there is a process of imagination, but that this does not entail images.28 
Rather, if we imagine seeing a chair, we imagine a chair in front of us, or perhaps 
in another place in the physical world, but never detached from the physical 
world.29 Even if we imagine something for which there is no equivalent in the 
world, for example a dragon, we imagine a dragon as if it were in the world.30 
Upon closer inspection, imagination does not work the same way as seeing, 
and we do not need mental pictures to account for it. In Ryle’s words: ‘there is 
thus no need to treat minds as the clandestine habitats of such fleshless beings’.31 
This alternative is similar to Place’s debunking of the phenomenological fallacy. 
Once we realize that we do not describe our experience in terms of properties of 
objects in the phenomenal field, but describe our experience by reference to the 
objects outside of us, there is no need to invoke the existence of a mental realm. In 
the case of the afterimage, we describe properties of objects that would ordinarily 
cause us to have that experience. So the green afterimage is not something before 
us, but an experience that corresponds to the experience of seeing something 
green which is there.32 
Whether this solution is convincing or not, Place thinks that now nothing 
stands in the way of a full explanation of conscious experience in terms of brain 
processes. He thereby paves the way for a position that is now adhered to by 
                                                 
28 Ibidem, p. 224–225. 
29 Ibidem, p. 233. 
30 Ibidem, p. 228. 
31 Ibidem, p. 232. 
32 Place [1956] p. 49. 
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Metzinger and other analytic philosophers of mind: that ultimately neuroscience 
can give a full explanation of conscious life.33 This motive, however, is absent from 
Ryle’s thought. Place even thinks Ryle’s theories in the end still allow too much of 
the inner processes.34 Ryle’s aim is not to do away with the dual-world view 
to ultimately choose between those worlds and opt for the physical one, but rather 
to re-evaluate the words we use to describe the mental. 
Thus, although the alternatives and the debates in which this theme surfa-
ces differ, the criticism of these early philosophers of mind is the same. Both philo-
sophers dismiss the reification of the mental, and both thinkers discuss this in the 
context of a broader criticism of a view of mental representationalism that 
involves a dual-world structure. 
3. The Illusion of Immanence: Sartre and Husserl 
We have seen that Metzinger’s use of Place’s phenomenological fallacy 
should be understood not just as a criticism of the reification of the mental, but of 
a dual-world representationalism which entails this reification. As we will see, 
criticism of this very specific view of the mental can also be found within the phe-
nomenological tradition. As said in the introduction, a striking similarity is the 
polemical term similar to the phenomenological fallacy. It is found in Sartre’s dis-
cussion of the imagination in The Imaginary.35 In this work, before giving his own 
theory of imagination, he presents the view he aims to criticize: 
[W]e have so far committed a double error. We thought, without justifying it to 
ourselves, that the image was in consciousness and that the object of the image 
was in the image. We depicted consciousness as a place peopled with small imita-
tions and these imitations were the images.  Without  any  doubt,  the  origin  of  
this  illusion  must  be sought in our habit of thinking in space and in terms of spa-
ce. I will call it: the illusion of immanence. […] [I]f we accept the illusion of imma-
nence, we are necessarily led to constitute the world of the mind from objects very 
similar to those of the external world and which, simply, obey different laws.36 
[W]e would fall into the illusion of immanence: we would implicitly suppose that 
there exist two complementary worlds: one of things and one of images [...]. This is 
                                                 
33 Metzinger [2009] p. 1. 
34 Place [1954], [1956] p. 44. 
35 Sartre [2004a]. 
36 Ibidem, p. 5–6. 
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putting images on the same plane as things, giving both the same type of existen-
ce.37 
These quotes show the striking similarity between the view Sartre criticizes 
and the one addressed by Place and Ryle. Sartre’s polemic notion – the illusion of 
immanence – consists of the same errors as its analytic counterpart. The mental is 
wrongly taken to be of a spatial nature. He also uses the same ‘two world’ termi-
nology as Ryle, an external and a mental world: ‘one of things and one of imag-
es’.38 The reification is also present, as the inner world is taken to contain literal 
objects, images, with the ‘the same type of existence’ as things.39 In his earlier 
work, The Imagination, Sartre had another polemical term for this, etymologically 
similar to reification. He accused Descartes, Hume and Leibniz of ‘thingism’.40 The 
third factor of the threefold structure is also present, as Sartre draws attention to 
the fact that these image-things are regarded as having the same kind of phenom-
enal properties, such as colors, shapes and smells, as things. As Sartre states: ‘The 
illusion of immanence consists in transferring the externality, spatiality, and all the 
sensible qualities of the thing to the transcendent psychic content’.41 Furthermore, 
Sartre addresses the idea of the projection or depiction of the outer world, as the 
images are taken to be small imitations of things in the outside world. Finally, Sar-
tre emphasizes, like Ryle, that this is the view of common sense, as well as that of 
many past philosophers, as Place does.42 
Thus, the illusion of immanence and the phenomenological fallacy are very 
similar polemical notions used to address the same dual-world 
representationalism. However, Sartre is not addressing a view of perception as 
Place does. Like Ryle, he discusses this view in the debate concerning imagina-
tion.43 Sartre uses the same type of reasoning concerning the misidentification of 
picturing as a form of seeing. He uses the example of looking at a chair, then clos-
                                                 
37 Ibidem, p. 43 
38 Ibidem. 
39 Ibidem. 
40 Sartre [2012] p. 6, 20. 
41 Sartre [2004a] p. 53. 
42 The fact that Sartre argues against common sense shows that the idea, shared by Metzinger and 
Zahavi, that phenomenology is a dressed-up version of folk psychology, is not in accordance with 
Sartre’s own ideas on what phenomenology entails. Zahavi [2005] p. 12; Metzinger [2006]. 
43 Apart from the many similarities in the criticism they offer, Sartre’s and Ryle’s alternatives are 
also very similar. For a comparison of the two accounts of imagination see: Turner [1968]; Ricoeur 
[1981]. 
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ing your eyes and imagining the same chair.44 Although Sartre thinks that both are 
acts of consciousness of the same object, namely the chair in the world outside of 
us, this criticism of mental imagery hinges on the idea that it can be compared 
with perception, which is assumed to be non-representational. Thus, Sartre’s aver-
sion against the inner world seems to be only applicable in the context of imagina-
tion, showing that his illusion of immanence is not the same as the phenomenolog-
ical fallacy after all. However, if we take a closer look at the origins of the illusion, 
namely the ideas of Husserl that inspired Sartre, we will see that this is not the 
case. The illusion of immanence is embedded in Sartre’s broader criticism of men-
tal reification and the inner world in general, which is aimed at all consciousness, 
including perception. 
Sartre’s debt to Husserl becomes apparent when we look at Sartre’s choice 
of words of the ‘double error’ in his formulation of the fallacy. At first glance, 
there seems to be no reason to divide the illusion in two errors. This seems to be, 
however, a reference to Husserl’s appendix to the fifth logical investigation,45 in 
which he distinguishes two ‘ineradicable errors’ concerning perception.46 The first 
one of these errors is the ‘image theory’. This image theory is the idea that each 
conscious act addressed at an object outside of us is mediated by an image or 
‘image-representation’.47 Needless to say, this image theory is very similar to the 
theory of perception Place criticizes. However, it should be noted that Husserl’s 
image theory is not the full-fledged dual-world representationalism as described 
by Place, Ryle and Sartre. He stresses the thing-like nature of the image, but does 
not yet speak in terms of an inner world in which the image resides.48 
The second error seems to be where Sartre found the inspiration for calling 
the illusion that of immanence – a choice of words he does not explicitly justify. 
Husserl calls it the ‘doctrine of the “immanent” objects of acts’.49 This is the idea 
that although mental acts do not require a representational image in the sense of 
a mental copy or depiction, there is still reason to assume a so-called intentional 
object inside of consciousness. The type of existence is ‘merely immanent’, as op-
                                                 
44 Ibidem, p. 7. 
45 Cumming [1992] p. 46. 
46 Husserl [2001b] p. 125. 
47 Ibidem. 
48 Husserl does make one small remark here that relates to a spatial account of consciousness: ‘One 
should not talk and think as if an image stood in the same relation to consciousness as a statue 
does to a room in which it is set up.’ [2001b] p. 126. 
49 Husserl [2001b] p. 125. 
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posed to the genuinely existing image in the image theory.50 This exposition of the 
doctrine of immanent objects is rather short, but Husserl discusses this topic more 
elaborately elsewhere, in a text called Intentional Objects, written earlier but pub-
lished posthumously – and therefore unknown to Sartre.51 
Husserl begins with describing several problems concerning non-existent 
objects that arise in the image theory. Consider the following: If one thinks about 
something which does not exist, the object may not exist, but there is still an image 
inside the inner realm which represents it. However, this image must exist if we 
are to be conscious of it. This causes two problems. The first problem is that the 
image of a non-existent object cannot be a true representation, because it cannot 
represent non-existence and exist at the same time. If it is no true representation, it 
cannot play its role as a mental image.52 The second problem is that the image is 
used to ‘point at’ or make judgments about that object.53 If the object does not ex-
ist, the image itself is the object at which the experience is pointed, thus abandon-
ing the function of the image altogether. These problems show that the image the-
ory cannot handle non-existent objects. 
The doctrine of immanent object serves as a solution to these problems. 
It states that every conscious act contains an object, but this object has no ‘“true” 
existence’, it exists as ‘merely intentional’.54 Whether the object truly exists or not 
is judged in a succeeding experience called an ‘existential judgment’. In this judg-
ment, the intentional object is compared to a state of affairs in the outside world.55 
The first problem of the image theory seems not to arise, as all intentional objects 
have the same type of ‘merely intentional’ existence, whether the object is judged 
to exist or not. The second problem also seems to be avoided, as the ‘pointing’ of 
every intentional object is only determined in the existential judgment, and not in 
the experience itself.  
Although it may look like the problems of the image theory are avoided, 
Husserl stresses that the doctrine of immanent objects entails the ‘false duplication 
which also doomed the image theory’ and ‘merely repeats the difficulty, only in 
                                                 
50 Ibidem, p. 126. 
51 This text was written in 1894 and 1895, but was not published until 1979 (Husserl [1994], footnote 
1). It is therefore safe to say that Sartre had not read this text when he wrote his works on imagina-
tion, and probably not in the last year before his death in 1980 either.  
52 Husserl [1994] p. 347–348. 
53 Ibidem, p. 348. 
54 Ibidem, p. 349. 
55 It should be noted that in most versions of representationalism the notion of the existential 
judgment does not make sense. If all consciousness requires representation, the things themselves 
can never be directly accessed in order to be compared to their representations.   
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different words’.56 The first problem, that of the correspondence of the immanent 
object to the represented object, remains. Because the immanent object has another 
type of existence, it can never truly correspond to the outside world in which 
things fully exist or do not exist. It would simply be another object existing within 
consciousness, and for Husserl it is ‘totally incomprehensible why we […] allow it 
to be regarded as only a ‘modified’ existence’.57 Things simply exist, or do not: 
there is no middle ground.  
Furthermore, an existential judgment would only make sense if it is the ex-
istence of the immanent object itself that is judged about. If this is not the case, 
then merely thinking about Berlin and judging that it exists are conscious acts with 
two different objects. The first one is about the intentional object as it exists inside 
of consciousness, the second one is about the state of affairs as it exists in the out-
side world. This does not make any sense according to Husserl, for ‘whether we 
merely represent Berlin, or judge it to be existing, in either case we are dealing 
with Berlin itself’.58 This also goes for non-existent objects. Merely thinking about 
a centaur concerns the intentional object, while the thought ‘centaurs does not ex-
ist’ is about the outside world.59 The existential judgments are by definition not 
about the immanent object but about a state of affairs in the world. This object al-
ways has a mere intentional type of existence, and cannot therefore be judged to 
truly exist or not. Existential judgments would therefore only make sense if they 
were about the true object. Thus, the solution of allowing the existence of mere 
immanent objects does not solve the problems of the image theory at all and there 
is for Husserl no further reason to assume such objects. 
As said, Sartre had no access to Husserl’s precise criticism of the doctrine of 
immanent objects as described here. He does, however, find his inspiration in 
Husserl’s alternative to the immanent object.60 Without going into details, Husserl 
refines the concept of intentionality by stating that consciousness is always struc-
tured as being directed at an object that transcends consciousness.61 Even in cases 
where there is no object in the outside world, the object is still presented as being 
outside of the act.62 The division between the intentional act of consciousness on 
                                                 
56 Ibidem. 
57 Ibidem, p. 351. 
58 Ibidem. 
59 Ibidem, p. 350. 
60 Sartre [2012] p. 129–130. 
61 Føllesdal [1978] p. 89. 
62 Føllesdal [1969] p. 680. 
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the one hand and the transcendent object on the other is Husserl’s essential dis-
covery according to Sartre.63 He regards the notion to have ‘as a goal the fighting 
of the errors of a certain immanentism that wants to constitute the world from 
contents of consciousness’.64 However, Sartre means by immanentism any theory 
that allows for contents of consciousness. Sartre considers Husserl’s notion of in-
tentionality ‘the essential principle of phenomenology’.65 He uses it in his own 
theory of imagination by defending the view that what we call an image is actual-
ly an intentional act and not a thing.66 Furthermore, the notion is the main inspira-
tion for Sartre’s entire early philosophical project: to purge consciousness from all 
its contents.67 For Sartre, this means that all (non-reflective) conscious experiences 
are always directed at an object outside of consciousness, even in the case of non-
existent objects which exist as ‘negatities’ (negative entities) in the world outside.68 
It should be noted however that Sartre’s purge of all contents from consciousness 
was seen by many followers of the latter as a deformation of Husserl’s concept of 
intentionality.69 Sartre himself admitted that he was ‘exhausting’ Husserl, and was 
creating his own ideas at Husserl’s expense. 70  
Thus, Sartre’s extensive debt to Husserl’s criticism of the doctrine of imma-
nent objects is more than that which gave the illusion its name. Sartre’s notion 
merges Husserl’s criticism of the image-theory and immanent objects, and adds 
the dual-world terminology. The fact that Sartre is continuing Husserl’s criticism 
of these errors concerning perception, and that the notion is embedded in Sartre’s 
broader project of radicalizing the notion of intentionality gives, us a reason to 
assume that the illusion of immanence is meant to be used in the context of all 
forms of experience, and not just imagination. This means that the illusion of im-
manence can be seen as a true phenomenological equivalent of the criticism of du-
                                                 
63 Sartre [2003] p. 17. 
64 Sartre [2012] p. 130. 
65 Sartre [2004b] p. 6. 
66 Sartre [2012] p. 144. 
67 Blosser [1986] p. 1; Sartre [1970]. 
68 Sartre [2003] p. 45. 
69 Sartre [2004a] p. ix, note 8. 
70 Sartre [1984] p. 183–184. The idea that Sartre has a more radical conception of the emptiness 
of consciousness than Husserl is strengthened by the fact that at one time he accuses Husserl of 
the illusion of immanence (Sartre [2004a] p. 59). This seems to be in line with Sartre’s addition 
of the spatial approach to the mental, which is not yet found in Husserl’s appendix to the fifth logi-
cal investigation. In his main work, Being and Nothingness, Sartre criticized Husserl again for having 
too spatial an account of consciousness (Sartre [2003] p. 50-61). For a further discussion of the dif-
ferences with regard to their thought on images, see: Cumming [1992] p. 48–56. 
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al-world representationalism offered in the analytical tradition and thereby of the 
phenomenological fallacy.71 
4. Metzinger’s Fallacy 
We have seen that both the analytic and the phenomenological tradition 
have pointed their arrows at dual-world representationalism. Let us now make 
a small excursion to the contemporary debate. Metzinger is an avid defender of 
representationalism.72 His theory of perception is centered around the idea that 
our experience is a representation or simulation of reality.73 According to him, the 
world we perceive is not the world as it really is out there. Our brains simulate 
a world-model in which only the aspects of the real world outside of us that are 
relevant in light of reproductive success and survival are present.74 Our ancestors, 
for example, adapted to see a specific range of the color spectrum. It was much 
later that scientists discovered that there is a broader range than we can experi-
ence. Such scientific discoveries have shown us that our ‘phenomenal world-
model’ of reality is only a fraction of an ‘inconceivably richer physical reality’.75  
At first glance, this seems inconsistent with the idea that the inner world is 
a copy or depiction of the outer world, as is stressed by Place, Ryle and Sartre, be-
cause our world model is extremely selective in what it represents.76 However, if 
the inner and outer world are fundamentally different, Metzinger’s own idea that 
we have to have an internal representation in order to survive falls flat. The prop-
erties of the world that are relevant to our survival can only be highlighted if they 
exist out there in the first place. Furthermore, the idea that the two worlds do cor-
respond to a certain level but may also have discrepancies is compatible with 
Place’s description of the phenomenological fallacy, where the afterimage is seen 
as an anomaly in the process of representation. Therefore, Metzinger does adhere 
to the view that the inner world depicts the outside world: 
                                                 
71 Apart from Sartre’s broader project, another reason to say that the illusion of immanence also 
applies to perception is that Sartre singles out Hume as someone who falls prey to the illusion. 
Immediately after introducing the illusion, he quotes Hume’s theory of impressions and ideas (Sar-
tre [2004a] p. 5–6). This is often seen as a classic example of an image theory of perception, viewing 
the mind as a theater in which perceptions appear (Hume [1978] p. 251–253; Bobro [2011]). Hume’s 
distinction is also criticized by Ryle, albeit in the context of sensation (Ryle [2009] p. 226–227), and 
he names him in the discussion of imagination (Ryle [2009] p. 247). 
72 Metzinger [2000], [2003] p. 1. 
73 Metzinger [2003] p. 13–14, [2009] p. 23. 
74 Metzinger [2003] p. 17, 203, [2009] p. 6. 
75 Metzinger [2003] p. 213, [2009] p. 6. 
76 Metzinger [2009] p. 22. 
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[T]he book you are holding right now—that is, the unified sensations of its color, 
weight, and texture—is just a shadow, a low-dimensional projection of a higher 
dimensional object “out there.” It is an image, a representation [...]77 
Here it is clear that the inner representation has fewer qualities than the ob-
ject outside, but it still has strong correspondence to the outside object that it rep-
resents. This quote also shows more aspects of Metzinger’s dual-world 
representationalism. Not only do we have the world-simulation and the outside 
world, but the inner world also has objects with sensible qualities that represent 
the outside world. He even uses the term “image” to describe the mental objects, 
implicitly invoking the classic image theory as described by Husserl.78 The similar-
ities go further, as he also uses the metaphor of projection, reminiscent of Place’s 
internal cinema.79 This is emphasized by another cinematic metaphor he uses to 
describe our experience, namely that of ‘technicolor phenomenology’.80 Thus, it 
seems that Metzinger himself falls prey to the phenomenological fallacy. Accord-
ing to his own theory of perception, we do not perceive the world outside us, but 
rather an internal world which contains objects that are sensible projections of the 
world outside us. 
A possible objection is that Metzinger’s ultimate goal is to show that there is 
only one world: the inner world is not a real world, it is only a simulation. There 
is a process of simulation we call experience, but experiences are not ‘countable 
entities’.81 This would seem to diminish the claim that he is a dual-world represen-
tationalist: there is only one real world, and one illusionary. The critics of the dual-
world view, however, stress that although the inner world is conceived as spatial 
and filled with objects, it is not of the same material as the world. The two worlds, 
although alike in structure, exist on a different plane. Place calls it the ‘mythologi-
cal’ phenomenal properties and objects, Ryle states that the mental ‘consists of 
consciousness’ like the physical is composed of matter.82 Although Metzinger 
wants to show that the inner world is only a simulation, it is still a necessary com-
ponent of his account of perception. We can never escape the simulation, as we are 
                                                 
77 Ibidem. 
78 Ibidem, p. 7, 8, 22, 45, 46. For a discussion of Metzinger’s representationalism in light of Husserl’s 
views see: Rinofner-Kreidl [2004]. 
79 Metzinger [2003] p. 548, [2009] p. 6, 22. 
80 Metzinger [2003] p. 549, [2009] p. 23. 
81 Metzinger [2009] p. 21. 
82 Place [1956] p. 49; Ryle [2009] p. 3. 
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biologically incapable of doing so.83 Only scientific data can show us that it is only 
an illusion.84 Although he ultimately prefers the physical world as the real one, he 
still posits two parallel worlds peopled with objects and properties, thus commit-
ting the phenomenological fallacy himself. 
5. Conclusion 
The study of the phenomenological fallacy and the illusion of immanence 
has shown that prominent representatives of both the early analytic philosophy 
of mind and the phenomenological tradition offer similar criticism of mental 
reification. In both traditions, this criticism of reification is embedded in a broader 
criticism of what I have called dual-world representationalism: a form of 
representationalism that entails dualism between an inner and outer world. Prom-
inent representatives of both traditions argue against a spatial conception of the 
mental, a literal inner world, in which literal sensible objects reside that depict 
the outside world. It is also stressed by many that this is the view of common 
sense, showing that it is difficult to describe the mental without somehow giving it 
a place and speaking in terms of depiction.  
Dual-world representationalism can manifest itself in various forms in dif-
ferent debates about mental activity. In debates about perception addressed by 
Place and to a lesser extent by Husserl, the idea is that we only perceive the out-
side world indirectly, mediated by the inner world. In debates about imagination, 
addressed by Ryle and Sartre, this view amounts to the idea that imagination is 
the perception of things inside us, analogous to ordinary perception of the world 
outside. However, in the different debates the underlying criticism of reification 
and representationalism is the same. This analysis shows that from a historical 
perspective, Metzinger’s implicit accusation that phenomenology falls prey to the 
phenomenological fallacy is unfounded. Furthermore, Metzinger himself falls 
prey to the fallacy by defending a form of dual-world representationalism in the 
form of the inner world-simulation that contains projections of things in the physi-
cal world outside. 
Metzinger says in his reply to Zahavi that historical scholarship is impor-
tant, but that it should not be a history of claims, but a history of the arguments 
given to support those claims.85 In that vein, rather than only showing that the 
criticism is prevalent in the history of philosophy, it is important to give argu-
                                                 
83 Metzinger [2009] p. 41. 
84 Ibidem, p. 9. 
85 Metzinger [2006] p. 2. 
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ments against dual-world representationalism. Although the authors discussed 
give many of them and most of them hinge on the idea that the position is incohe-
rent, let me stress the following one. Although the inner world represents the out-
side world, we can never know how faithful this representation is, and different 
people may have different views on the world which may lead to all kinds of con-
flicts. If all our experience only takes place inside inner worlds, then different hu-
man beings would have no shared world, resulting into solipsism and rendering 
intersubjectivity impossible. This is a serious threat for a philosophical account of 
meaningful co-existence. Metzinger does not seem to be concerned with this, 
though, as he refers to the problem of whether there is a world outside of expe-
rience only mockingly: ‘In philosophy, we call this game epistemology—the theory 
of knowledge. We have been playing it for centuries.’86 
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